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Abstract: The Court of Justice of the European Union, alongside national courts, provides not only a
consistent and uniform application of European law but, Apparently paradoxical, from a certain
perspective, creates new rules of law. Of course, at first glance, our assumption may seem
hazardously, and in any case not in accordance the “classic” conception that the judge is only meant
to apply a law to a particular case, issuing rules of law shall be the competence of the legal bodies of
states. In these circumstances, we considered it useful to examine an ancient Roman law concept -
iurisdictio - and show that it is still current. Usually, when the magistrate “speaks right”, the solution
which will be given will be implicitly included in the rule indicated (which is pre-existing) because
the judge is only to find, after the debates and on the evidence, whether the rule of law is not
applicable or practical case to be decided. However, this study also addresses the way in which
iurisdictio operates in terms of the European judge activity within the preliminary ruling procedure.
Keywords: iurisdictio; European Union law; the Court of Justice of the European Union; preliminary
rulings; jurisdictional activity
1. Introduction
An important role in the current development of European law has the Court of
Justice of the European Union. This court, alongside national courts, provides not
only a consistent and uniform application of European law but, apparently
paradoxical, from a certain perspective creates new rules of law. Of course, at first
glance, our assumption may seem hazardously, and in any case not in accordance
the “classic” conception that the judge is only meant to apply a law to a particular
case, issuing rules of law shall be the competence of the legal bodies of states.
In a very recent study on the methods and functions of comparative law (Sinani,
Shanto, 2013, p 32), invoking a Roman aphorism - jus dicere, non jus dare - it is
claimed this classic thesis and is argued that “judge not create law, but only
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interprets and applies the law in particular cases in practice.” But also from the
Roman law comes iurisdictio attribute that defines the foundation of the judge
activity and which, etymologically, means “speaks right”. Prima facie, it would
appear that there is an apparent contradiction in terms, which would be contrary to
Roman law rigor.
In these circumstances, we considered it useful to examine an ancient Roman law
concept - iurisdictio - and show that it is still current. However, we believe it is
useful to complete a previous study, already published on the interpretation
function of European judge (Cimpoeru, 2013, pp. 19-24), with these contributions
of this paper. An argument in support of this method of approach is just the close
relationship between the interpretation function and iurisdictio which represent two
facets of the European judge activity on the preliminary ruling proceedings.
2. Iurisdictio - Roman Law Perspective
As shown in the literature (Molcut, Oancea, 1993, p 60), Roman private law has
experienced three procedural systems: legis actiones system, formulary system, and
cognitio extraordinarem (extraordinary system).
The first two procedural systems, legis actiones and formulary system were
characterized by the division of the process into two phases: in iure (in front of the
magistrate) and in iudicio (in front of the judge).
The magistrate had a main task to organize the trial in determining what it is about
(de quo re agitur), he performed a public dignity. Usually, the praetor performed
duties of the magistrate, and consuls or governors had such powers. The magistrate
(praetor) had two competencies: iurisdictio and imperium.
In the legis actiones system, iurisdictio was the right of the magistrate to pursue the
forms (procedures) by whereby the parties watched to assert claims. Depending on
the role of the magistrate, iurisdictio was of two kinds: contentiosa and voluntaria.
In the first case, the parties had divergent interests, and the trial was finalized with
a sentence. In the second case, the interests of the parties were not divergent and
the magistrate cooperated with each other to achieve a legal form of agreement
between them. Imperium was the magistrate's power which broadly included
iurisdictio.
The judge was a private person, chosen by the parties and confirmed by the
magistrate who intervened in the second phase of the trial (in iudicio) and led the
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contradictory discussions, listened plea lawyers, assessed the evidence and
pronounced sentence, and then returned to a simple person.
Note at this point that the magistrate exercised iurisdictio (“speaks right”), both in
contentious proceedings (contentiosa) and in non-contentious proceedings
(voluntaria).
In the formulary system, the praetor’s role, as the holder of iurisdictio evolves. It
was drawn the formula which, essentially, represents a specific procedure for each
claim (action). By formula, the praetor gave instructions to the judge how to judge
the claim.
The formula contained several main parts:
- intentio indicated asserting the plaintiff's claims;
- demonstratio included the legal cause of the plaintiff's claims;
- condemnatio which empowered the judge to pronounce a conviction or
acquittal;
- adiudicato which gave the judge the power to transfer property (in trials in
the object property).
In the extraordinary system, the trial was conducted from beginning to end by the
magistrate who takes over the duties of the judge. The extraordinary procedure has
its origins in the magistrates' right to settle certain disputes without sending the
parties in front of the judge. This right was exercised under the imperium power.
3. Iurisdictio - Modern Perspective
To elucidate the issue it seem interesting the comments made by Professor Mircea
Manolescu (1993, p. 65) concerning the jurisdictional act characterization in terms
of Roman law: “the praetor drew up formula with which judge then continue into
another phase jurisdictional act; the praetor did not make anything but set the rule,
namely the major premise, and the judge determined the facts, namely minor
premise (....).
The praetor did not establish the rule in the sense that it created at that moment
(strictly speaking, there were sometimes situations when the praetor created a new
formula if the applicant's claims were not included in a pre-existing model of
formula), but he made only a conditional syllogism, saying that if the judge finds
such situation then condemn, if you find another situation, not to condemn.”
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Analyzing the formulary procedure, the author finds an apparent paradox in terms
of the deployment chronology of the jurisdictional act. Thus, to the Romans, first
of all it was established the rule of law, and then there were examined the facts in
relation to this. This “reversal” of the specific phases of law enforcement is only
apparent. It shows that after facts analyzing of the facts, the praetor establishes
which rule is applicable. Further, the judge must go back “to the facts” to check
“norm” indicated by the praetor.
In other words, the author points out that “we do not talk about the application of
law to the facts, but the discovery of the rule (norm) which addresses to a particular
character symptomatic of the fact.” Further, it states that “it is not absurd that
Roman magistrate, firstly established the rule and from it the symptom; after that
the judge, noting whether or not the symptom, gave the solution. Because when the
problem is thus solved, the solution pre-exist, and only then it can be explained that
the famous declarative character of the court decision”.
Beyond a certain imprecision of terms less used in the juridical literature1, we
believe that this interpretation about the praetor’s activity is worthy of interest.
When the magistrate “speaks right” (iurisdictio), he chooses and indicates the rule
of law to be checked by the judge whether or not is applicable to the specific fact
(case).
This iurisdictio power of the magistrate, which was specific to the legis actiones
and formulary systems (when the trial was divided into two phases), will remain in
Roman law in the extraordinary system when the magistrate takes over the judge’s
powers and there is a single person who judge.
Usually, when the magistrate “speaks right”, the solution which will be given will
be implicitly included in the rule indicated (which is pre-existing) because the
judge is only to find, after the debates and on the evidence, whether the rule of law
is not applicable or practical case to be decided.
This implicit nature of the solution, meaning that this is included by default in a
pre-existing rule of law, only “spoken” by a magistrate, explained in a satisfactory
way the declarative character of the court decisions. In this regard, it should be a
short comment.
1 In the cited book, N. Manolescu proposes a new approach to the Law science of as "legal clinic", by
analogy with what is known in medical science "medical clinic". Hence the abundance of the medical
terms, such as diagnosis, treatment, clinical investigation, symptoms, etc.
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As it is known, in addition to the declarative court decisions which produces
retroactive effects (ex tunc), there are decisions that produces effects only for the
future (ex nunc). It is the case of the rights constitutive claims when the plaintiff
requests enforcement of the law to certain facts on which it relies in order to create
a new legal situation. Can we explain by the magistrate’s iurisdictio from Roman
law and the ex nunc effects of the constitutive character of the court decisions? We
believe that the answer to this question may be yes.
In the formulary system if the magistrate thought that the applicant's claims are
founded, but there is no corresponding model formula under his iurisdictio, he had
the right to create a new formula, showing the judge, in mandatory terms, how to
proceed in solving dispute (Molcut, Oancea, 1993, p 72). In other words, the
magistrate enacted a new rule of law applied only to this case. Unlike the first case,
the solution given by the judge is implicitly contained in a pre-existing formula
when the magistrate “speaks right”, in the second case, the solution is included in
the new formula created by iurisdictio.
Of course, this theoretical approach, which allows a large extent explain of the
constitutive character of the court decisions, is insufficient and has only one
primary nature. The “Praetorian law”, containing creative solutions of the praetor,
as we have seen, was the starting point of jurisprudence as a source of law.
Unlike the systems connected to the Anglo-Saxon civilization basin where the
jurisprudence is recognized as a source of law, in the legal systems belonging to
the Roman-Germanic family, the case law has a limited creative role only
indirectly, such as Romanian judgments of the High Court of Cassation and Justice
in the matter of appeals on points of law or Romanian decisions on
unconstitutionality of legal texts of the Constitutional Court (Popa, Eremia, Cristea,
2005, pp. 176-177).
From this perspective, it is clear that additional arguments are needed to
substantiate the constitutive character of court decisions, but this does not form the
subject of this study.
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4. Iurisdictio Mechanism in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
As shown in a previous study (Cimpoeru, 2013, pp. 16-17), preliminary ruling
procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union in terms of art. 267 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union1, covers two categories of
disputes:
6.1. In the case of „litigation of interpretation” of the EU Treaties, because his
original privilege - iurisdictio - the European judge is authorized to o “say” (to
“choice”, to “indicate”) a certain “norm” from “text” as the Treaty relevant. Note
that in this case the CJEU has an absolute and native competence to interpret
officially Union treaties.
6.2. In the case of „litigation of interpretation” of EU derivatives acts (acts adopted
by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union), the situation
is more nuanced.
In this case, the interpretation becomes a dual aspect: the European judge will
interpret both “norms” contained by of the derivative act (lower rank act) and
“norms” from “text” EU Treaties (higher rank act) also, eventually, under the
empire of iurisdictio will “choose” only the norm that is consistent with the „text”
of Union treaties.
6.3. In the case of „litigation of legality” of EU derivatives acts (acts adopted by
the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union), the situation is
similar to that presented in section 6.2. Comparing the normative content of the
derivative act with the higher act one, the judge can establish whether that the act is
“valid” or “invalid” in relation to the EU Treaties.
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